The war of the peripheries: A social mapping of IDF casualties in the Al-Aqsa Intifada

With the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000), the Israeli state impressively regained its relative autonomous capacity in managing a prolonged military undertaking without significant internal opposition, in contrast to the erosion in autonomy during the Lebanon War (1982-2000) and the first Intifada (1987-1993). Arguably, the state's relative autonomy increased in light of the changes in the social composition of the military's casualties in combat in the territories. While in the first week of the Lebanon War, about 55% of the fallen belonged to peripheral social groups, which previously held marginal military roles, in the Al-Aqsa Intifada the percentage rose to about 75%. This social change was reflected in the re-shaping of the bereavement ethos from protest to an acceptance of the sacrifice. Hence, the absence of effective political organization during the Al-Aqsa Intifada that could have challenged the military thought and limited its professional autonomy.