Routing for security in networks with adversarial nodes

We consider the problem of secure unicast transmission between two nodes in a directed graph, where an adversary eavesdrops/jams a subset of nodes. This adversarial setting is in contrast to traditional ones where the adversary controls a subset of links. In particular, we study, in the main, the class of routing-only schemes (as opposed to those allowing coding inside the network). Routing-only schemes usually have low implementation complexity, yet a characterization of the rates achievable by such schemes was open prior to this work. We first propose an LP based solution for secure communication against eavesdropping, and show that it is information-theoretically rateoptimal among all routing-only schemes. The idea behind our design is to balance information flow in the network so that no subset of nodes observe 'too much' information. Interestingly, we show that the rates achieved by our routing-only scheme are always at least as good as, and sometimes better, than those achieved by 'naïve' network coding schemes (i.e. the rateoptimal scheme designed for the traditional scenario where the adversary controls links in a network rather than nodes.) We also demonstrate non-trivial network coding schemes that achieve rates at least as high as (and again sometimes better than) those achieved by our routing schemes, but leave open the question of characterizing the optimal rate-region of the problem under all possible coding schemes. We then extend these routing-only schemes to the adversarial node-jamming scenarios and show similar results. During the journey of our investigation, we also develop a new technique that has the potential to derive nontrivial bounds for general secure-communication schemes.