Rational emotions

Meir Meshulam, Eyal Winter, Gershon Ben-Shakhar, Itzhak Aharon

פרסום מחקרי: פרסום בכתב עתמאמרביקורת עמיתים

תקציר

We present here the concept of rational emotions: Emotions may be directly controlled and utilized in a conscious, analytic fashion, enabling an individual to size up a situation, to determine that a certain "mental state" is strategically advantageous and adjust accordingly. Building on the growing body of literature recognizing the vital role of emotions in determining decisions, we explore the complementary role of rational choice in choosing emotional states. Participants played the role of "recipient" in the dictator game, in which an anonymous "dictator" decides how to split an amount of money between himself and the recipient. A subset of recipients was given a monetary incentive to be angry at low-split offers. That subset demonstrated increased physiological arousal at low offers relative to high offers as well as more anger than other participants. These results provide a fresh outlook on human decision-making and contribute to the continuing effort to build more complete models of rational behavior.

שפה מקוריתאנגלית
עמודים (מ-עד)11-17
מספר עמודים7
כתב עתSocial Neuroscience
כרך7
מספר גיליון1
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs)
סטטוס פרסוםפורסם - ינו׳ 2012
פורסם באופן חיצוניכן

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