Multi-sided advertising markets: Dynamic mechanisms and incremental user compensations

Moran Feldman, Gonen Frim, Rica Gonen

פרסום מחקרי: פרק בספר / בדוח / בכנספרסום בספר כנסביקורת עמיתים


Online advertising has motivated companies to collect vast amounts of information about users, which increasingly creates privacy concerns. One way to answer these concerns is by enabling end users to choose which aspects of their private information can be collected. Based on principles suggested by Feldman and Gonen (2018), we introduce a new online advertising market model which uses information brokers to give users such control. Unlike Feldman and Gonen (2018), our model is dynamic and involves multi-sided markets where all participating sides are strategic. We describe a mechanism for this model which is theoretically guaranteed to (approximately) maximize the gain from trade, avoid a budget deficit and incentivize truthfulness and voluntary participation. As far as we know, this is the first known dynamic mechanism for a multi-sided market having these properties. We experimentally examine and compare our theoretical results using real world advertising bid data. The experiments suggest that our mechanism performs well in practice even in regimes for which our theoretical guarantee is weak or irrelevant.

שפה מקוריתאנגלית
כותר פרסום המארחDecision and Game Theory for Security - 9th International Conference, GameSec 2018, Proceedings
עורכיםLinda Bushnell, Radha Poovendran, Tamer Basar
מוציא לאורSpringer Verlag
מספר עמודים21
מסת"ב (מודפס)9783030015534
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs)
סטטוס פרסוםפורסם - 2018
אירוע9th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2018 - Seattle, ארצות הברית
משך הזמן: 29 אוק׳ 201831 אוק׳ 2018

סדרות פרסומים

שםLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
כרך11199 LNCS
ISSN (מודפס)0302-9743
ISSN (אלקטרוני)1611-3349


כנס9th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2018
מדינה/אזורארצות הברית

הערה ביבליוגרפית

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

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