Generalized trade reduction mechanisms

Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov

פרסום מחקרי: פרק בספר / בדוח / בכנספרסום בספר כנסביקורת עמיתים


When designing a mechanism there are several desirable properties to maintain such as incentive compatibility (IC), individual rationality (IR), and budget balance (BB). It is well known [15] that it is impossible for a mechanism to maximize social welfare whilst also being IR, IC, and BB. There have been several attempts to circumvent [15] by trading welfare for BB, e.g., in domains such as doublesided auctions[13], distributed markets[3] and supply chain problems[2, 4]. In this paper we provide a procedure called a Generalized Trade Reduction (GTR) for single-value players, which given an IR and IC mechanism, outputs a mechanism which is IR, IC and BB with a loss of welfare. We bound the welfare achieved by our procedure for a wide range of domains. In particular, our results improve on existing solutions for problems such as double sided markets with homogenous goods, distributed markets and several kinds of supply chains. Furthermore, our solution provides budget balanced mechanisms for several open problems such as combinatorial double-sided auctions and distributed markets with strategic transportation edges.

שפה מקוריתאנגלית
כותר פרסום המארחEC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce
מספר עמודים10
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs)
סטטוס פרסוםפורסם - 2007
פורסם באופן חיצוניכן
אירוע8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'07 - San Diego, CA, ארצות הברית
משך הזמן: 11 יוני 200715 יוני 2007

סדרות פרסומים

שםEC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce


כנס8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'07
מדינה/אזורארצות הברית
עירSan Diego, CA

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