תקציר
This article claims that types of reward systems that form the mechanism of military recruitment affect types of civilian control over the military. Specifically, the alteration of the reward system from institution/symbolic to occupation/material modes has changed the mode of civilian control from republican to market control. Market control has supplanted the historical citizen-soldier model of civilian control, by which the political community supervised the military through the social groups serving in it and their social networks. Market control is characterized by the market-oriented monitoring of military activity, which is mainly focused on the military resources and the commodification of military service, which produced the market regulation of recruitment. This has a contradictory effect on the army's freedom of action: while the military is given greater leeway in administering belligerent policies, it has fewer resources with which to fund them.
שפה מקורית | אנגלית |
---|---|
עמודים (מ-עד) | 1-29 |
מספר עמודים | 29 |
כתב עת | Polity |
כרך | 41 |
מספר גיליון | 1 |
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs) | |
סטטוס פרסום | פורסם - ינו׳ 2009 |
פורסם באופן חיצוני | כן |