Do coalition and formateur expectations affect vote switching?

Liran Harsgor, Reut Itzkovitch-Malka, Or Tuttnauer

פרסום מחקרי: פרסום בכתב עתמאמרביקורת עמיתים


The existing literature on vote switching - a major cause of electoral change - rarely discusses strategic incentives as motivating voters to switch parties between elections. We study how coalition-directed voting, a common type of strategic voting in parliamentary democracies, affects vote switching. Utilizing an original three-wave online panel survey conducted in Israel in 2019-2020, we show that voters engage in formateur optimization and policy balancing: they switch their vote in order to affect the identity of the next formateur and desert a party they previously voted for if they believe it will not enter the next coalition. We also show that the perceived level of competition between potential formateurs moderates the effect of coalition expectations on vote switching. The paper highlights the importance of coalition and formateur considerations in electoral change and contributes to a better understanding of both coalition-directed voting and individual-level vote switching.

שפה מקוריתאנגלית
עמודים (מ-עד)96-115
מספר עמודים20
כתב עתEuropean Political Science Review
מספר גיליון1
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs)
סטטוס פרסוםפורסם - 10 פבר׳ 2023

הערה ביבליוגרפית

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of European Consortium for Political Research.

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