We study the possibility space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and two nonidentical items (four outcomes). Our model has multidimensional types, private values, nonnegative prices, and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation - the players are subject to publicly known budget constraints. We show that the space we study essentially includes one type of mechanisms: autocratic mechanisms (a form of dictatorship). Furthermore, we prove that there are families of autocratic mechanisms that uniquely fulfill the basic properties of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto efficient. The mechanisms in the autocratic families are identical except for two to three price parameters that differentiate them.
הערה ביבליוגרפיתPublisher Copyright:
© 2013 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin / Boston 2013.