TY - JOUR
T1 - Comprehensive rationalizability
AU - Heifetz, Aviad
AU - Meier, Martin
AU - Schipper, Burkhard C.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2019/7
Y1 - 2019/7
N2 - We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies a new version of “common cautious belief in rationality” based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. Differently from existing iterative strategy elimination procedures in the literature, it should rather be viewed as an iterative strategy demotion procedure as it requires some memory of previously discarded strategies. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications.
AB - We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies a new version of “common cautious belief in rationality” based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. Differently from existing iterative strategy elimination procedures in the literature, it should rather be viewed as an iterative strategy demotion procedure as it requires some memory of previously discarded strategies. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications.
KW - Common assumption of rationality
KW - Common belief in rationality
KW - Iterated admissibility
KW - Lexicographic belief systems
KW - Rationalizability
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85066397849&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.002
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.002
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AN - SCOPUS:85066397849
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 116
SP - 185
EP - 202
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -