תקציר
Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subject's assertion that p matches her nonverbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology.
שפה מקורית | אנגלית |
---|---|
עמודים (מ-עד) | 193-203 |
מספר עמודים | 11 |
כתב עת | Thought |
כרך | 6 |
מספר גיליון | 3 |
מזהי עצם דיגיטלי (DOIs) | |
סטטוס פרסום | פורסם - ספט׳ 2017 |
הערה ביבליוגרפית
Publisher Copyright:© 2017 The Thought Trust and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.