TY - JOUR
T1 - A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups
AU - Lerner, Anat
PY - 1998/2
Y1 - 1998/2
N2 - This paper deals with a pie allocation problem to users, who are divided intosharing groups, that are not necessarily disjoint. The pie is allocated among the groups, rather than the users. The portion of a sharing group is a public good for its members, that is, all of them can enjoy it. A non-cooperative game for allocating the pie and a special equilibrium outcome,strongly disappointment-free allocation, are defined. We prove the existence of a unique such allocation and show that it coincides with the Nash solution of the related bargaining problem.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C71, C72 and C78.
AB - This paper deals with a pie allocation problem to users, who are divided intosharing groups, that are not necessarily disjoint. The pie is allocated among the groups, rather than the users. The portion of a sharing group is a public good for its members, that is, all of them can enjoy it. A non-cooperative game for allocating the pie and a special equilibrium outcome,strongly disappointment-free allocation, are defined. We prove the existence of a unique such allocation and show that it coincides with the Nash solution of the related bargaining problem.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C71, C72 and C78.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0038900511&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/game.1997.0594
DO - 10.1006/game.1997.0594
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???
AN - SCOPUS:0038900511
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 22
SP - 316
EP - 330
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -