TY - JOUR
T1 - What to maximize if you must
AU - Heifetz, Aviad
AU - Shannon, Chris
AU - Spiegel, Yossi
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2007 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2007/3
Y1 - 2007/3
N2 - The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a central tenet in economics, often justified formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary arguments. In contrast, we show that in almost every game and for almost every family of distortions of a player's actual payoffs, some degree of this distortion is beneficial to the player, and will not be driven out by any evolutionary process involving payoff-monotonic selection dynamics. Consequently, under any such selection dynamics the population will not converge to payoff-maximizing behavior. We also show that payoff-maximizing behavior need not prevail when preferences are imperfectly observed.
AB - The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a central tenet in economics, often justified formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary arguments. In contrast, we show that in almost every game and for almost every family of distortions of a player's actual payoffs, some degree of this distortion is beneficial to the player, and will not be driven out by any evolutionary process involving payoff-monotonic selection dynamics. Consequently, under any such selection dynamics the population will not converge to payoff-maximizing behavior. We also show that payoff-maximizing behavior need not prevail when preferences are imperfectly observed.
KW - Evolution of preferences
KW - Evolutionary stability
KW - Interdependent preferences
KW - Overconfidence
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33847036774&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.013
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.013
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AN - SCOPUS:33847036774
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 133
SP - 31
EP - 57
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -