Theory construction and the projectability of meta-inductive arguments

Scientists and philosophers of science often draw methodological lessons from successful theories to justify methods of theory construction and to guide research programs.This paper proposes an epistemic framework for this practice, articulated in terms of the notion of meta-induction. By analogy to Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’, it introduces the concept of projectability of meta-inductive arguments, and demonstrates its significance in any account of meta-inductive reasoning. Likewise to scientific induction, meta-induction is shown to be constrained by naturalist epistemology in determining which classifications of theoretical methods are ‘projectable’. Projectability judgments in meta-inductive arguments help ensure that when taking lessons from past theorizing (either as a part of scientific discussions or in a philosophical reflections about science), they would be based on the way evidence was exploited in theory construction or on theoretically plausible hypothesis about the natural world, rather than on human-made concepts. This framework emphasizes the primacy of empirically guided patterns of conjecture over purely formal considerations, enabling epistemic evaluation of research projects, even when theorizing is primarily grounded on abstract theoretical methods and at stages when direct evidence is unavailable. The paper discusses possible implications on philosophical debates concerning theory assessment in fundamental physics, particularly regarding meta-empirical justification, as well as discussions on model transfer in the special sciences.