TY - JOUR
T1 - The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
AU - Heifetz, Aviad
PY - 2006/7
Y1 - 2006/7
N2 - The existence of a common prior is a property of the state space used to model the players' incomplete information. We show that this property is not just a technical artifact of the model, but that it is immanent to the players' beliefs. To this end, we devise a condition, phrased solely in terms of the players' mutual beliefs about the basic, objective issues of possible uncertainty, which is equivalent to the existence of a common prior. This condition specifies a countable sequence of questions addressed to the players, which detects when there is no common prior among them.
AB - The existence of a common prior is a property of the state space used to model the players' incomplete information. We show that this property is not just a technical artifact of the model, but that it is immanent to the players' beliefs. To this end, we devise a condition, phrased solely in terms of the players' mutual beliefs about the basic, objective issues of possible uncertainty, which is equivalent to the existence of a common prior. This condition specifies a countable sequence of questions addressed to the players, which detects when there is no common prior among them.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33747193518&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.002
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.002
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AN - SCOPUS:33747193518
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 56
SP - 105
EP - 120
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -