The logic of body counting: from Korea to Gaza

This study examines body counting practices of enemy combatants across six critical conflicts: Korea (1950–1953), Vietnam (1955–1975), Iraq (2003–2011), Afghanistan (2001–2014), Israel’s operations in the West Bank and Gaza (from the late 2010’s onward), and the Israel-Gaza war (2023–2025). I argue that body counting repeatedly emerged as a key criterion for assessing military progress once warfare shifted from occupying territory to pursuing other goals, such as attrition, destroying enemy forces, enhancing deterrence, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. Post-World War II military managerialism made this criterion a ready-made method. Such vague and often unwinnable goals coincided with diminished legitimacy for the use of force and for bearing its associated costs. Thus, the legitimation system shifted from legitimating results—the outcomes of military operations—to legitimating means, focusing on how results are produced and emphasizing their direct impact through casualty numbers. Initially, body counting served as a criterion for progress, but over time it assumed additional functions: encouraging killing, reflecting and promoting dehumanization, demonstrating resolve, mitigating casualty sensitivity, and serving as a humanizing mechanism by distinguishing between intentionally killing combatants and protecting non-combatants.