The dynamic evolution of preferences

Aviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon, Yossi Spiegel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)251-286
Number of pages36
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Aug 2007


  • Evolution of preferences
  • Evolutionary stability
  • Interdependent preferences
  • Overconfidence


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