TY - UNPB
T1 - The capacity limits of mental simulation
AU - Balaban, Halely
AU - Ullman, Tomer
PY - 2024/4/14
Y1 - 2024/4/14
N2 - People have severe capacity limits when they track objects in direct perception. But how many objects can people track in their imagination? In seven pre-registered experiments (N=241 total), we examined the capacity limits of mentally simulating the movement of objects in the mind's eye. In a novel \taskname task, we had participants continue the motion of animated objects in their mind up to a pre-defined point. When tracking one object in the imagination (Experiment 1a), participants gave estimations well in line with ground truth. But, when imagining two objects (Experiment 1b), behavior altered substantially: responses when tracking two objects in the imagination were fit best by the predictions of a Serial Model that simulates only one object at a time, as opposed to a Parallel Model that simulates objects in tandem. The serial bottleneck is not due to response/motor limitations (Experiment 2), and is reduced -- but not eliminated -- by adding extremely strong grouping cues (Experiment 3). Additional studies validate that the serial effect is not due to noise, exists in both realistic and hyper-simplified physics, and is unaffected by motivation (Experiments S1-S3). Altogether, we find that the capacity of moving entities in the imagination is likely restricted to a single object at a time.
AB - People have severe capacity limits when they track objects in direct perception. But how many objects can people track in their imagination? In seven pre-registered experiments (N=241 total), we examined the capacity limits of mentally simulating the movement of objects in the mind's eye. In a novel \taskname task, we had participants continue the motion of animated objects in their mind up to a pre-defined point. When tracking one object in the imagination (Experiment 1a), participants gave estimations well in line with ground truth. But, when imagining two objects (Experiment 1b), behavior altered substantially: responses when tracking two objects in the imagination were fit best by the predictions of a Serial Model that simulates only one object at a time, as opposed to a Parallel Model that simulates objects in tandem. The serial bottleneck is not due to response/motor limitations (Experiment 2), and is reduced -- but not eliminated -- by adding extremely strong grouping cues (Experiment 3). Additional studies validate that the serial effect is not due to noise, exists in both realistic and hyper-simplified physics, and is unaffected by motivation (Experiments S1-S3). Altogether, we find that the capacity of moving entities in the imagination is likely restricted to a single object at a time.
U2 - 10.31234/osf.io/xzcmb
DO - 10.31234/osf.io/xzcmb
M3 - Preprint
BT - The capacity limits of mental simulation
PB - Center for Open Science
ER -