Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants

Moran Feldman, Rica Gonen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


We consider mechanisms for markets that are two-sided and have agents with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The agents of the market are strategic and act to optimize their own utilities, while the mechanism designer aims to optimize a social goal, i.e., the gain from trade. We focus on one example of this setting motivated by a foreseeable privacy-aware future form of online advertising. Recently, it has been suggested that markets of user information built around information brokers could be introduced to the online advertising ecosystem to overcome online privacy concerns. Such markets give users control over which data gets shared in online advertising exchanges. We describe a model for the above form of online advertising and design two mechanisms for this model. The first is a deterministic mechanism which is related to the vast literature on mechanism design through trade reduction and allows agents with a multi-dimensional strategic space. The second is a randomized mechanism that can handle a more general version of the model. We provide theoretical analyses of our mechanisms and study their performance using simulations based on real-world data.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, SAGT 2018, Proceedings
EditorsXiaotie Deng
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)9783319996592
StatePublished - 2018
Event11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2018 - Beijing, China
Duration: 11 Sep 201813 Sep 2018

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume11059 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.


  • Double-sided market
  • Mechanism design
  • Multi-dimensional players
  • Online advertising market


Dive into the research topics of 'Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this