Putnam's multiple realization argument against type-physicalism

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationJust the Arguments
Subtitle of host publication100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy
EditorsMichael Bruce, Steven Barbone
Number of pages3
ISBN (Electronic)9781444344431
ISBN (Print)9781444336375
StatePublished - 7 Oct 2011


  • "brain states" and "mental states" rather than to properties
  • Argument, simple in structure
  • P1 exposing real meaning of type-physicalism
  • P2, expressing multiple realization thesis
  • Putnam's argument, way for functionalist view of the mind
  • Putnam's multiple realization argument against type-physicalism
  • Putnam's multiple realization argument undermining "type-physicalism"
  • Type-physicalism (most probably) false
  • Type-physicalism, single realizability of mental properties
  • Type-physicalism, single realization of mental properties

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