Plantinga on Materialism and Intentionality

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Alvin Plantinga (2006) presents an argument against materialism that is concerned with intentionality. His main contention is that according to materialism, intentionality is not a basic property of the brain or of any part thereof, and that intentionality cannot be determined by interactions among various physical items. I take issues with the latter claim, and argue that there is no reason to think that intentionality cannot be thus determined. I also suggest that Plantinga's failure is anything but accidental: the phenomenon of intentionality is neutral with respect to the mind-body problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)113-120
Number of pages8
JournalAnalysis and Metaphysics
StatePublished - Jan 2011

Bibliographical note

Accession Number: 74447965; Authors: Horowitz, Amir 1; Email Address:; Affiliations: 1: Open University of Israel; Subject: Materialism; Subject: Philosophy; Subject: Positivism; Subject: Realism; Subject: Dualism; Author-Supplied Keyword: content; Author-Supplied Keyword: derived intentionality; Author-Supplied Keyword: dualism; Author-Supplied Keyword: indication; Author-Supplied Keyword: intentionality; Author-Supplied Keyword: materialism; Author-Supplied Keyword: original intentionality; Number of Pages: 8p


  • Materialism
  • Philosophy
  • Positivism
  • Realism
  • Dualism
  • content
  • derived intentionality
  • dualism
  • indication
  • intentionality
  • materialism
  • original intentionality


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