Partial Revelation with Rational Expectations

Aviad Heifetz, Heracles M. Polemarchakis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We exhibit a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium, where no individual knows the state of the world or the quantities traded by any other individual.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D82.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)171-181
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume80
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1998
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Copyright:
Copyright 2004 Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam. All rights reserved.

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