On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability

Aviad Heifetz, Andrés Perea

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Abstract Pearce’s (Econometrica 52:1029–1050, 1984) extensive-form rationalizablity (EFR) is a solution concept embodying a best-rationalization principle (Battigalli, Games Econ Behav 13:178–200, 1996; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, J Econ Theory 106:356–391, 2002) for forward-induction reasoning. EFR strategies may hence be distinct from backward-induction (BI) strategies.We provide a direct and transparent proof that, in perfect-information games with no relevant ties, the unique BI outcome is nevertheless identical to the unique EFR outcome, even when the EFR strategy profile and the BI strategy profile are distinct.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)37-59
Number of pages23
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - 19 Mar 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014.


  • Backward induction
  • Extensive-form rationalizability
  • Forward induction


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