TY - GEN
T1 - Network codes resilient to jamming and eavesdropping
AU - Yao, Hongyi
AU - Silva, Danilo
AU - Jaggi, Sidharth
AU - Langberg, Michael
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - We consider the problem of communicating information over a network secretly and reliably in the presence of a hidden adversary who can eavesdrop and inject malicious errors. We provide polynomial-time, rate-optimal distributed network codes for this scenario, improving on the rates achievable in [1]. Our main contribution shows that as long as the sum of the adversary's jamming rate ZO and his eavesdropping rate ZI is less than the network capacity C, (i.e., ZO + ZI < C), our codes can communicate (with vanishingly small error probability) a single bit correctly and without leaking any information to the adversary. We then use this to design codes that allow communication at the optimal source rate of C -ZO -ZI, while keeping the communicated message secret from the adversary. Interior nodes are oblivious to the presence of adversaries and perform random linear network coding; only the source and destination need to be tweaked. In proving our results we correct an error in prior work [2] by a subset of the authors in this work.
AB - We consider the problem of communicating information over a network secretly and reliably in the presence of a hidden adversary who can eavesdrop and inject malicious errors. We provide polynomial-time, rate-optimal distributed network codes for this scenario, improving on the rates achievable in [1]. Our main contribution shows that as long as the sum of the adversary's jamming rate ZO and his eavesdropping rate ZI is less than the network capacity C, (i.e., ZO + ZI < C), our codes can communicate (with vanishingly small error probability) a single bit correctly and without leaking any information to the adversary. We then use this to design codes that allow communication at the optimal source rate of C -ZO -ZI, while keeping the communicated message secret from the adversary. Interior nodes are oblivious to the presence of adversaries and perform random linear network coding; only the source and destination need to be tweaked. In proving our results we correct an error in prior work [2] by a subset of the authors in this work.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77957857386&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/NETCOD.2010.5487669
DO - 10.1109/NETCOD.2010.5487669
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AN - SCOPUS:77957857386
SN - 9781424471904
T3 - 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Network Coding, NetCod 2010
SP - 31
EP - 36
BT - 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Network Coding, NetCod 2010
T2 - 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Network Coding, NetCod 2010
Y2 - 9 June 2010 through 11 June 2010
ER -