Abstract
This paper introduces a new class of mechanisms based on negotiation between market participants. This model allows us to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility result and present a bilateral market mechanism that is efficient, individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced in the single-unit heterogeneous setting. The underlying scheme makes this combination of desirable qualities possible by reporting a price range for each buyer-seller pair that defines a zone of possible agreements, while the final price is left open for negotiation.
Original language | English |
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Pages | 1-8 |
Number of pages | 8 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2004 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,EC'04 - New York, NY, United States Duration: 17 May 2004 → 20 May 2004 |
Conference
Conference | Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,EC'04 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | New York, NY |
Period | 17/05/04 → 20/05/04 |
Keywords
- Efficient Markets
- Mechanism Design
- Negotiation-Range Mechanisms