Negotiation-range mechanisms: Coalition-resistant markets

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Negotiation-range mechanisms offer a novel approach to achieving efficient markets based on finding the maximum weighted matching in a weighted bipartite graph connecting buyers and sellers. Unlike typical markets, negotiation-range mechanisms establish negotiation terms between paired bidders rather than set a final price for each transaction. This subtle difference allows single-unit heterogenous negotiation-range markets to achieve desirable properties that cannot coexist in typical markets. This paper extends the useful properties of negotiation-range mechanisms to include coalition-resistance, making them the first markets known to offer protection from coalitions. Additionally, the notion of negotiation-range mechanisms is extended to include a restricted setting of combinatorial markets.1

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
EditorsSusanne Albers, Tomasz Radzik
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages383-394
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)3540230254, 9783540230250
DOIs
StatePublished - 2004
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3221
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

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