TY - CHAP
T1 - Information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments
T2 - Evidence from subjective confidence
AU - Koriat, Asher
AU - Nussinson, Ravit
AU - Bless, Herbert
AU - Shaked, Nira
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
Copyright:
Copyright 2019 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2013/1/1
Y1 - 2013/1/1
N2 - Dual-process theories have been very influential in social psychology and cognitive psychology. These theories postulate a distinction between two modes of thought that underlie judgment and behavior (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Different labels have been proposed to describe the two modes (see Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004): nonanalytic versus analytic (Jacoby & Brooks, 1984), associative versus rule based (Sloman, 1996), impulsive versus reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), experiential versus rational (Epstein & Pacini, 1999), and heuristic versus systematic (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Although each of these labels emphasizes different aspects of the distinction, there is a general agreement that one mode of thought is fast, automatic, effortless, and implicit, whereas the other is slow, deliberate, effortful, and consciously monitored. Several researchers preferred to use the labels proposed by Stanovich and West (2000), System 1 versus System 2, which are more neutral.
AB - Dual-process theories have been very influential in social psychology and cognitive psychology. These theories postulate a distinction between two modes of thought that underlie judgment and behavior (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Different labels have been proposed to describe the two modes (see Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004): nonanalytic versus analytic (Jacoby & Brooks, 1984), associative versus rule based (Sloman, 1996), impulsive versus reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), experiential versus rational (Epstein & Pacini, 1999), and heuristic versus systematic (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Although each of these labels emphasizes different aspects of the distinction, there is a general agreement that one mode of thought is fast, automatic, effortless, and implicit, whereas the other is slow, deliberate, effortful, and consciously monitored. Several researchers preferred to use the labels proposed by Stanovich and West (2000), System 1 versus System 2, which are more neutral.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064101311&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.4324/9780203805503
DO - 10.4324/9780203805503
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AN - SCOPUS:85064101311
SN - 9780805862140
SP - 117
EP - 135
BT - Handbook of Metamemory and Memory
PB - Taylor and Francis
ER -