Individualism and Narrow Content

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The view that psychological explanations cannot but be individualistic (i.e., shared by duplicates) and the view of semantic externalism (i.e., that mental contents are not determined by individualistic features) seem to jeopardize the idea of intentional psychology. Introducing the notion of narrow content (as a function from environment to broad, referential, content) is supposed to defend the possibility of intentional psychology, and to reconcile it with both psychological individualism and semantic externalism. The introduction of narrow content is necessary to defend intentional psychology from the externalist threat. My argument to this effect will also shed light on the sense in which narrow content is semantic and indeed deserves to be called "narrow content". Though content ascriptions are, on their face value, ascriptions of broad content, they also have narrow readings that capture individualistic features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)139-153
Number of pages15
JournalLinguistic and Philosophical Investigations
StatePublished - Jan 2009

Bibliographical note

Accession Number: 43292320; HOROWITZ, AMIR 1; Email Address:; Affiliations: 1: Open University of Israel; Issue Info: 2009, Vol. 8, p139; Thesaurus Term: Semantics; Thesaurus Term: Metaphysics; Subject Term: Individualism; Subject Term: Motivation (Psychology); Subject Term: Content (Psychology); Subject Term: Philosophy of mind; Subject Term: Philosophy -- Research; Number of Pages: 15p; Document Type: Article


  • Semantics
  • Metaphysics
  • Individualism
  • Motivation (Psychology)
  • Content (Psychology)
  • Philosophy of mind
  • Philosophy -- Research


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