Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

Françoise Forges, Aviad Heifetz, Enrico Minelli

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)349-365
Number of pages17
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume18
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2001
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Copyright:
Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Core
  • General equilibrium
  • Incentive compatibility

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