For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures

Ivar R. Hannikainen; Edouard Machery; David Rose; Stephen Stich; Christopher Y. Olivola; Paulo Sousa; Florian Cova; Emma E. Buchtel; Mario Alai; Adriano Angelucci; Renatas Berniûnas; Amita Chatterjee; Hyundeuk Cheon; In Rae Cho; Daniel Cohnitz; Vilius Dranseika; Ángeles Eraña Lagos; Laleh Ghadakpour; Maurice Grinberg; Takaaki Hashimoto; Amir Horowitz; Evgeniya Hristova; Yasmina Jraissati; Veselina Kadreva; Kaori Karasawa; Hackjin Kim; Yeonjeong Kim; Minwoo Lee; Carlos Mauro; Masaharu Mizumoto; Sebastiano Moruzzi; Jorge Ornelas; Barbara Osimani; Carlos Romero; Alejandro Rosas López; Massimo Sangoi; Andrea Sereni; Sarah Songhorian; Noel Struchiner; Vera Tripodi; Naoki Usui; Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado; Hrag A. Vosgerichian; Xueyi Zhang; Jing Zhu

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428

For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures

Ivar R. Hannikainen, Edouard Machery, David Rose, Stephen Stich, Christopher Y. Olivola, Paulo Sousa, Florian Cova, Emma E. Buchtel, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniûnas, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Takaaki HashimotoAmir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas López, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Hrag A. Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang, Jing Zhu

Philosophy discipline

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.

Original language	English
Article number	2428
Journal	Frontiers in Psychology
Volume	10
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428
State	Published - 5 Nov 2019

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This research was made possible through the support of a grant (IH-112) from the Fuller Theological Seminary/Thrive Center, in concert with the John Templeton Foundation, awarded to EM and SS. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John Templeton Foundation.

Funding Information:
We thank James Andow, Hugo Viciana and the members of the Pittsburgh Empirical Philosophy Lab, particularly Wesley Buckwalter, for feedback on previous versions of this manuscript. Funding. This research was made possible through the support of a grant (IH-112) from the Fuller Theological Seminary/Thrive Center, in concert with the John Templeton Foundation, awarded to EM and SS. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John Templeton Foundation.

Publisher Copyright:
© Copyright © 2019 Hannikainen, Machery, Rose, Stich, Olivola, Sousa, Cova, Buchtel, Alai, Angelucci, Berniûnas, Chatterjee, Cheon, Cho, Cohnitz, Dranseika, Eraña Lagos, Ghadakpour, Grinberg, Hashimoto, Horowitz, Hristova, Jraissati, Kadreva, Karasawa, Kim, Kim, Lee, Mauro, Mizumoto, Moruzzi, Ornelas, Osimani, Romero, Rosas López, Sangoi, Sereni, Songhorian, Struchiner, Tripodi, Usui, Vázquez del Mercado, Vosgerichian, Zhang and Zhu.

Keywords

alternate possibilities
cognitive style
compatibilism
dispositionism
free will
situationism
sourcehood

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10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428

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Hannikainen, I. R., Machery, E., Rose, D., Stich, S., Olivola, C. Y., Sousa, P., Cova, F., Buchtel, E. E., Alai, M., Angelucci, A., Berniûnas, R., Chatterjee, A., Cheon, H., Cho, I. R., Cohnitz, D., Dranseika, V., Eraña Lagos, Á., Ghadakpour, L., Grinberg, M., ... Zhu, J. (2019). For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, Article 2428. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428

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Hannikainen, IR, Machery, E, Rose, D, Stich, S, Olivola, CY, Sousa, P, Cova, F, Buchtel, EE, Alai, M, Angelucci, A, Berniûnas, R, Chatterjee, A, Cheon, H, Cho, IR, Cohnitz, D, Dranseika, V, Eraña Lagos, Á, Ghadakpour, L, Grinberg, M, Hashimoto, T, Horowitz, A, Hristova, E, Jraissati, Y, Kadreva, V, Karasawa, K, Kim, H, Kim, Y, Lee, M, Mauro, C, Mizumoto, M, Moruzzi, S, Ornelas, J, Osimani, B, Romero, C, Rosas López, A, Sangoi, M, Sereni, A, Songhorian, S, Struchiner, N, Tripodi, V, Usui, N, Vázquez del Mercado, A, Vosgerichian, HA, Zhang, X & Zhu, J 2019, 'For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures', Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 10, 2428. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428

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AU - Hannikainen, Ivar R.

AU - Machery, Edouard

AU - Rose, David

AU - Stich, Stephen

AU - Olivola, Christopher Y.

AU - Sousa, Paulo

AU - Cova, Florian

AU - Buchtel, Emma E.

AU - Alai, Mario

AU - Angelucci, Adriano

AU - Berniûnas, Renatas

AU - Chatterjee, Amita

AU - Cheon, Hyundeuk

AU - Cho, In Rae

AU - Cohnitz, Daniel

AU - Dranseika, Vilius

AU - Eraña Lagos, Ángeles

AU - Ghadakpour, Laleh

AU - Grinberg, Maurice

AU - Hashimoto, Takaaki

AU - Horowitz, Amir

AU - Hristova, Evgeniya

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AU - Kim, Hackjin

AU - Kim, Yeonjeong

AU - Lee, Minwoo

AU - Mauro, Carlos

AU - Mizumoto, Masaharu

AU - Moruzzi, Sebastiano

AU - Ornelas, Jorge

AU - Osimani, Barbara

AU - Romero, Carlos

AU - Rosas López, Alejandro

AU - Sangoi, Massimo

AU - Sereni, Andrea

AU - Songhorian, Sarah

AU - Struchiner, Noel

AU - Tripodi, Vera

AU - Usui, Naoki

AU - Vázquez del Mercado, Alejandro

AU - Vosgerichian, Hrag A.

AU - Zhang, Xueyi

AU - Zhu, Jing

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © Copyright © 2019 Hannikainen, Machery, Rose, Stich, Olivola, Sousa, Cova, Buchtel, Alai, Angelucci, Berniûnas, Chatterjee, Cheon, Cho, Cohnitz, Dranseika, Eraña Lagos, Ghadakpour, Grinberg, Hashimoto, Horowitz, Hristova, Jraissati, Kadreva, Karasawa, Kim, Kim, Lee, Mauro, Mizumoto, Moruzzi, Ornelas, Osimani, Romero, Rosas López, Sangoi, Sereni, Songhorian, Struchiner, Tripodi, Usui, Vázquez del Mercado, Vosgerichian, Zhang and Zhu.

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Y1 - 2019/11/5

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KW - cognitive style

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KW - free will

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For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures

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Keywords

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