Epistemic Game Theory: Incomplete Information

Aviad Heifetz

doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2663

Epistemic Game Theory: Incomplete Information

Aviad Heifetz

Economics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

In a game of incomplete information some of the players possess private information which may be relevant to the strategic interaction. Private information is modelled by a type space, in which every type of each player is associated with a belief about the basic issues of uncertainty (like payoffs) and about the other players’ types. At a Bayesian equilibrium each type chooses a strategy which maximizes its expected payoff given the choice of strategies by the other players’ types. Bayesian equilibrium payoffs are often inefficient relative to the equilibrium payoffs that would result had the players been fully informed.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Third Edition
Editors	Matias Vernengo, Esteban Perez Caldentey, Barkley J. Rosser Jr
Publisher	Palgrave Macmillan
Pages	3820-3824
Number of pages	5
ISBN (Electronic)	9781349951895
ISBN (Print)	9781349951888
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2663
State	Published - 1 Jan 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018.

Keywords

Bayesian equilibrium
Bayesian strategies
Common knowledge
Epistemic game theory: incomplete information
Games with incomplete information
Private information

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10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2663

Cite this

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Epistemic Game Theory: Incomplete Information

Abstract

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Keywords

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