Efforts in two-sided contests

Gil S. Epstein, Shmuel Nitzan, Mordechai E. Schwarz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The degree of rent dissipation is studied in extended two-sided contests that involve two types of efforts. While usual contestants expend resources in trying to win the contested prize, potential recipients of the rent-seeking efforts also participate in the contest. This is due to uncertainty regarding the source of power in the contest that induces the bureaucrats to expend resources to increase their share in the rent-seeking efforts by trying to appear as the party controlling the allocation of the prize. We show that the existing theoretical and empirical studies are incomplete and may underestimate the extent of rent dissipation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)283-291
Number of pages9
JournalPublic Choice
Issue number3-4
StatePublished - Sep 2008

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Acknowledgements We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful and important comments. Financial support from the Adar Foundation of the Economics Department of Bar-Ilan University is gratefully acknowledged.


  • Contests
  • Incomplete information
  • Lobbying
  • Rent dissipation
  • Transparency


Dive into the research topics of 'Efforts in two-sided contests'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this