We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties, and prove existence.
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We are grateful to Pierpaolo Battigalli for numerous insightful comments and suggestions and to Elchanan Ben Porath for helpful discussions and exchange of ideas. We thank Paulo Barelli, Andy McLennan, Yoram Halevy as well as to seminar participants at Barcelona, Bocconi, Brescia, Caltech, Maryland, Maastricht, Pittsburgh, USC, UC Davis, Tel Aviv, Vienna, Stony Brook 2007, LOFT 2008, Games 2008, NSF/NBER/CEME 2009, and UECE Lisbon 2010. Aviad is grateful for financial support from the Open University of Israelʼs Research Fund grant no. 46106 . Martin was supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia via a Ramon y Cajal Fellowship (IAE-CSIC) and a Research Grant ( SEJ 2006-02079 ). Burkhard is grateful for financial support from the NSF SES-0647811 . Previous versions of the paper contained material that is now circulated in Heifetz et al. (2011) and Meier and Schipper (2012) .
- Extensive-form games
- Extensive-form rationalizability