Distributed computing meets game theory: Robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation

Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev, Rica Gonen, Joe Halpern

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We study k-resilient Nash equilibria, joint strategies where no member of a coalition C of size up to k can do better, even if the whole coalition defects. We show that such k-resillent Nash equilibria exist for secret sharing and multiparty computation, provided that players prefer to get the information than not to get it. Our results hold even if there are only 2 players, so we can do multiparty computation with only two rational agents. We extend our results so that they hold even in the presence of up to t players with " unexpected" utilities. Finally, we show that our techniques can be used to simulate games with mediators by games without mediators.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 25th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing 2006
Pages53-62
Number of pages10
StatePublished - 2006
Externally publishedYes
Event25th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing 2006 - Denver, CO, United States
Duration: 23 Jul 200626 Jul 2006

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
Volume2006

Conference

Conference25th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing 2006
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityDenver, CO
Period23/07/0626/07/06

Keywords

  • Distributed Computing
  • Game Theory
  • Secret Sharing
  • Secure Multiparty Computation

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