TY - JOUR
T1 - Dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions
AU - Lerner, Anat
AU - Gonen, Rica
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2013 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin / Boston 2013.
PY - 2013/5/8
Y1 - 2013/5/8
N2 - We study the possibility space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and two nonidentical items (four outcomes). Our model has multidimensional types, private values, nonnegative prices, and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation - the players are subject to publicly known budget constraints. We show that the space we study essentially includes one type of mechanisms: autocratic mechanisms (a form of dictatorship). Furthermore, we prove that there are families of autocratic mechanisms that uniquely fulfill the basic properties of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto efficient. The mechanisms in the autocratic families are identical except for two to three price parameters that differentiate them.
AB - We study the possibility space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and two nonidentical items (four outcomes). Our model has multidimensional types, private values, nonnegative prices, and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation - the players are subject to publicly known budget constraints. We show that the space we study essentially includes one type of mechanisms: autocratic mechanisms (a form of dictatorship). Furthermore, we prove that there are families of autocratic mechanisms that uniquely fulfill the basic properties of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto efficient. The mechanisms in the autocratic families are identical except for two to three price parameters that differentiate them.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84893037145&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1515/bejte-2013-0006
DO - 10.1515/bejte-2013-0006
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AN - SCOPUS:84893037145
SN - 1534-5955
VL - 13
SP - 363
EP - 380
JO - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
JF - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
IS - 1
ER -