Comprehensive rationalizability

Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier, Burkhard C. Schipper

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies a new version of “common cautious belief in rationality” based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. Differently from existing iterative strategy elimination procedures in the literature, it should rather be viewed as an iterative strategy demotion procedure as it requires some memory of previously discarded strategies. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)185-202
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - Jul 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier Inc.


  • Common assumption of rationality
  • Common belief in rationality
  • Iterated admissibility
  • Lexicographic belief systems
  • Rationalizability


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