One-sided auctions have long been studied in economics and the computer science multi-agent planning domain [10, 12, 21]. One-sided auctions aim to find a high-social welfare (SWF) (efficient) allocation of a commodity to a set of agents, while ensuring that agents' best strategy is to truthfully report their input. An important extension of one-sided auctions are one-sided combinatorial auctions [17, 19, 20] where multiple commodities are offered for sale. Agents bid on bundles of commodities, which allows agents to express complex preferences over subsets of commodities (see  for many examples within). An elegant and well-studied class of combinatorial one-sided auctions are the sequential posted price auctions in which agents are presented sequentially with a vector of prices and must choose their preferred bundle given the price vector (among the first studied are [1, 18]). One-sided combinatorial auctions have been applied to various problems, including airport time-slot allocation , distributed query optimization  and transportation service procurement .