Brief announcement: New mechanisms for pairwise kidney exchange

Hossein Efsandiari; Guy Kortsarz

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_25

Brief announcement: New mechanisms for pairwise kidney exchange

Hossein Efsandiari, Guy Kortsarz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game. Ashlagi et al. [1] present a 2-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for this problem. We note that the variance of the utility of an agent in this mechanism may be as large as Ω(n²), which is not desirable in a real application. Here, we resolve this issue by providing a 2-approximation randomized truthful mechanism in which the variance of the utility of each agent is at most 2 + ε. Later, we derandomize our mechanism and provide a deterministic mechanism such that, if an agent deviates from the mechanism, she does not gain more than 2[log₂ m].

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Algorithmic Game Theory - 8th International Symposium, SAGT 2015
Editors	Martin Hoefer, Martin Hoefer
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	303-304
Number of pages	2
ISBN (Print)	9783662484326
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_25
State	Published - 2015
Externally published	Yes
Event	8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2015 - Saarbrucken, Germany Duration: 28 Sep 2015 → 30 Sep 2015

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	9347
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2015
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Saarbrucken
Period	28/09/15 → 30/09/15

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015.

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_25

Cite this

Efsandiari, H., & Kortsarz, G. (2015). Brief announcement: New mechanisms for pairwise kidney exchange. In M. Hoefer, & M. Hoefer (Eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory - 8th International Symposium, SAGT 2015 (pp. 303-304). Article A25 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9347). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_25

Efsandiari, Hossein ; Kortsarz, Guy. / Brief announcement : New mechanisms for pairwise kidney exchange. Algorithmic Game Theory - 8th International Symposium, SAGT 2015. editor / Martin Hoefer ; Martin Hoefer. Springer Verlag, 2015. pp. 303-304 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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Efsandiari, H & Kortsarz, G 2015, Brief announcement: New mechanisms for pairwise kidney exchange. in M Hoefer & M Hoefer (eds), Algorithmic Game Theory - 8th International Symposium, SAGT 2015., A25, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 9347, Springer Verlag, pp. 303-304, 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2015, Saarbrucken, Germany, 28/09/15. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_25

Brief announcement: New mechanisms for pairwise kidney exchange. / Efsandiari, Hossein; Kortsarz, Guy.
Algorithmic Game Theory - 8th International Symposium, SAGT 2015. ed. / Martin Hoefer; Martin Hoefer. Springer Verlag, 2015. p. 303-304 A25 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 9347).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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Efsandiari H, Kortsarz G. Brief announcement: New mechanisms for pairwise kidney exchange. In Hoefer M, Hoefer M, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory - 8th International Symposium, SAGT 2015. Springer Verlag. 2015. p. 303-304. A25. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_25

Brief announcement: New mechanisms for pairwise kidney exchange

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