Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subject's assertion that p matches her nonverbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology.
|Number of pages||11|
|State||Published - Sep 2017|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
We would like to thank John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the Fuller T heological Seminary/T hrive Center in concert with the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John Templeton Foundation.
© 2017 The Thought Trust and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- behavioral circumscription
- folk psychology