At the threshold of knowledge

Daniel Rothschild, Levi Spectre

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We explore consequences of the view that to know a proposition your rational credence in the proposition must exceed a certain threshold. In other words, to know something you must have evidence that makes rational a high credence in it. We relate such a threshold view to Dorr et al.’s (Philosophical Studies 170(2):277–287, 2014) argument against the principle they call fair coins: “If you know a coin won’t land tails, then you know it won’t be flipped.” They argue for rejecting fair coins because it leads to a pervasive skepticism about knowledge of the future. We argue that the threshold view of evidence and knowledge gives independent grounds to reject fair coins.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)449-460
Number of pages12
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1 Feb 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.


  • Epistemological skepticism about the future
  • Evidence
  • Inference
  • Knowledge
  • Probability
  • Rational-belief
  • Thresholds
  • Tolerance principle


Dive into the research topics of 'At the threshold of knowledge'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this