We present an ascending-price mechanism for a multi-sided market with a variety of participants, such as manufacturers, logistics agents, insurance providers, and assemblers. Each deal in the market may consist of a combination of agents from separate categories, and different such combinations are simultaneously allowed. This flexibility lets multiple intersecting markets be resolved as a single global market. Our mechanism is obviously-truthful, strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and attains almost the optimal gain-from-trade when the market for every allowed combination of categories is sufficiently large. We evaluate the performance of the suggested mechanism with experiments on real stock market data and synthetically produced data.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
The second author would like to thank the Ministry of Science, Technology and Space Binational Israel-Taiwan grant, number 3-16542 .
© 2023 Elsevier B.V.
- Multi-sided markets
- Strong budget balance
- Truthful auctions