Abstract
We present an ascending-price mechanism for a multi-sided market with a variety of participants, such as manufacturers, logistics agents, insurance providers, and assemblers. Each deal in the market may consist of a combination of agents from separate categories, and different such combinations are simultaneously allowed. This flexibility lets multiple intersecting markets be resolved as a single global market. Our mechanism is obviously-truthful, strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and attains almost the optimal gain-from-trade when the market is sufficiently large. We evaluate the performance of the suggested mechanism with experiments on real stock market data and synthetically produced data.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Multi-Agent Systems - 18th European Conference, EUMAS 2021, Revised Selected Papers |
| Editors | Ariel Rosenfeld, Nimrod Talmon |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH |
| Pages | 1-18 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9783030822538 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2021 |
| Event | 18th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2021 - Virtual, Online Duration: 28 Jun 2021 → 29 Jun 2021 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
|---|---|
| Volume | 12802 LNAI |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
| Conference | 18th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2021 |
|---|---|
| City | Virtual, Online |
| Period | 28/06/21 → 29/06/21 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Keywords
- Multi-sided markets
- Strong budget balance
- Truthful auctions