We present an ascending-price mechanism for a multi-sided market with a variety of participants, such as manufacturers, logistics agents, insurance providers, and assemblers. Each deal in the market may consist of a combination of agents from separate categories, and different such combinations are simultaneously allowed. This flexibility lets multiple intersecting markets be resolved as a single global market. Our mechanism is obviously-truthful, strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, and attains almost the optimal gain-from-trade when the market is sufficiently large. We evaluate the performance of the suggested mechanism with experiments on real stock market data and synthetically produced data.
|Title of host publication||Multi-Agent Systems - 18th European Conference, EUMAS 2021, Revised Selected Papers|
|Editors||Ariel Rosenfeld, Nimrod Talmon|
|Publisher||Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH|
|Number of pages||18|
|State||Published - 2021|
|Event||18th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2021 - Virtual, Online|
Duration: 28 Jun 2021 → 29 Jun 2021
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)|
|Conference||18th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2021|
|Period||28/06/21 → 29/06/21|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
The second author would like to thank the Ministry of Science, Technology and Space 995 Binational Israel-Taiwan grant, number 3-16542.
© 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
- Multi-sided markets
- Strong budget balance
- Truthful auctions