A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals

Daniel Rothschild; Levi Spectre

doi:10.1111/nous.12183

A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals

Daniel Rothschild, Levi Spectre

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a disjunction.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	473-478
Number of pages	6
Journal	Nous
Volume	52
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12183
State	Published - Jun 2018

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© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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10.1111/nous.12183

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abstract = "We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams{\textquoteright} Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a disjunction.",

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A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals

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