A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals

Daniel Rothschild, Levi Spectre

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a disjunction.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)473-478
Number of pages6
JournalNous
Volume52
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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