Abstract
In this paper we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game. This game naturally appears in situations that some service providers benefit from pairwise allocations on a network, such as the kidney exchanges between hospitals. Ashlagi et al. [1] present a 2-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for this problem. This is the best known result in this setting with multiple players. However, we note that the variance of the utility of an agent in this mechanism may be as large as Ω(n2), which is not desirable in a real application. In this paper we resolve this issue by providing a 2-approximation randomized truthful mechanism in which the variance of the utility of each agent is at most 2 + ε. As a side result, we apply our technique to design a deterministic mechanism such that, if an agent deviates from the mechanism, she does not gain more than 2┌log2 m┐.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | LATIN 2016 |
| Subtitle of host publication | Theoretical Informatics - 12th Latin American Symposium, Proceedings |
| Editors | Gonzalo Navarro, Evangelos Kranakis, Edgar Chávez |
| Publisher | Springer Verlag |
| Pages | 416-428 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9783662495285 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 12th Latin American Symposium on Theoretical Informatics, LATIN 2016 - Ensenada, Mexico Duration: 11 Apr 2016 → 15 Apr 2016 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
|---|---|
| Volume | 9644 |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
| Conference | 12th Latin American Symposium on Theoretical Informatics, LATIN 2016 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | Mexico |
| City | Ensenada |
| Period | 11/04/16 → 15/04/16 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016.