Removal and threshold pricing: Truthful two-sided markets with multi-dimensional participants

Moran Feldman, Rica Gonen

نتاج البحث: فصل من :كتاب / تقرير / مؤتمرمنشور من مؤتمرمراجعة النظراء


We consider mechanisms for markets that are two-sided and have agents with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The agents of the market are strategic and act to optimize their own utilities, while the mechanism designer aims to optimize a social goal, i.e., the gain from trade. We focus on one example of this setting motivated by a foreseeable privacy-aware future form of online advertising. Recently, it has been suggested that markets of user information built around information brokers could be introduced to the online advertising ecosystem to overcome online privacy concerns. Such markets give users control over which data gets shared in online advertising exchanges. We describe a model for the above form of online advertising and design two mechanisms for this model. The first is a deterministic mechanism which is related to the vast literature on mechanism design through trade reduction and allows agents with a multi-dimensional strategic space. The second is a randomized mechanism that can handle a more general version of the model. We provide theoretical analyses of our mechanisms and study their performance using simulations based on real-world data.

اللغة الأصليةالإنجليزيّة
عنوان منشور المضيفAlgorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, SAGT 2018, Proceedings
المحررونXiaotie Deng
ناشرSpringer Verlag
عدد الصفحات13
رقم المعيار الدولي للكتب (المطبوع)9783319996592
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء
حالة النشرنُشِر - 2018
الحدث11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2018 - Beijing, الصين
المدة: ١١ سبتمبر ٢٠١٨١٣ سبتمبر ٢٠١٨

سلسلة المنشورات

الاسمLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
مستوى الصوت11059 LNCS
رقم المعيار الدولي للدوريات (المطبوع)0302-9743
رقم المعيار الدولي للدوريات (الإلكتروني)1611-3349


!!Conference11th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2018

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Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.


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