Plantinga on Materialism and Intentionality

Amir Horowitz

Plantinga on Materialism and Intentionality

Amir Horowitz

פילוסופיה

نتاج البحث: نشر في مجلة › مقالة › مراجعة النظراء

ملخص

Alvin Plantinga (2006) presents an argument against materialism that is concerned with intentionality. His main contention is that according to materialism, intentionality is not a basic property of the brain or of any part thereof, and that intentionality cannot be determined by interactions among various physical items. I take issues with the latter claim, and argue that there is no reason to think that intentionality cannot be thus determined. I also suggest that Plantinga's failure is anything but accidental: the phenomenon of intentionality is neutral with respect to the mind-body problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

اللغة الأصلية	إنجليزيّة أمريكيّة
الصفحات (من إلى)	113-120
عدد الصفحات	8
دورية	Analysis and Metaphysics
مستوى الصوت	10
حالة النشر	نُشِر - يناير 2011

ملاحظة ببليوغرافية

Accession Number: 74447965; Authors: Horowitz, Amir 1; Email Address: [email protected]; Affiliations: 1: Open University of Israel; Subject: Materialism; Subject: Philosophy; Subject: Positivism; Subject: Realism; Subject: Dualism; Author-Supplied Keyword: content; Author-Supplied Keyword: derived intentionality; Author-Supplied Keyword: dualism; Author-Supplied Keyword: indication; Author-Supplied Keyword: intentionality; Author-Supplied Keyword: materialism; Author-Supplied Keyword: original intentionality; Number of Pages: 8p

الوصول إلى المستند

http://elib.openu.ac.il/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=74447965&site=eds-live

قم بذكر هذا

@article{40aad80e5a054645b6ef6f0dce3d6ed4,

title = "Plantinga on Materialism and Intentionality",

abstract = "Alvin Plantinga (2006) presents an argument against materialism that is concerned with intentionality. His main contention is that according to materialism, intentionality is not a basic property of the brain or of any part thereof, and that intentionality cannot be determined by interactions among various physical items. I take issues with the latter claim, and argue that there is no reason to think that intentionality cannot be thus determined. I also suggest that Plantinga's failure is anything but accidental: the phenomenon of intentionality is neutral with respect to the mind-body problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]",

keywords = "Materialism, Philosophy, Positivism, Realism, Dualism, content, derived intentionality, dualism, indication, intentionality, materialism, original intentionality",

author = "Amir Horowitz",

note = "Accession Number: 74447965; Authors: Horowitz, Amir 1; Email Address: [email protected]; Affiliations: 1: Open University of Israel; Subject: Materialism; Subject: Philosophy; Subject: Positivism; Subject: Realism; Subject: Dualism; Author-Supplied Keyword: content; Author-Supplied Keyword: derived intentionality; Author-Supplied Keyword: dualism; Author-Supplied Keyword: indication; Author-Supplied Keyword: intentionality; Author-Supplied Keyword: materialism; Author-Supplied Keyword: original intentionality; Number of Pages: 8p",

year = "2011",

month = jan,

language = "American English",

volume = "10",

pages = "113--120",

journal = "Analysis and Metaphysics",

issn = "1584-0778",

publisher = "Addleton Academic Publishers",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Plantinga on Materialism and Intentionality

AU - Horowitz, Amir

N1 - Accession Number: 74447965; Authors: Horowitz, Amir 1; Email Address: [email protected]; Affiliations: 1: Open University of Israel; Subject: Materialism; Subject: Philosophy; Subject: Positivism; Subject: Realism; Subject: Dualism; Author-Supplied Keyword: content; Author-Supplied Keyword: derived intentionality; Author-Supplied Keyword: dualism; Author-Supplied Keyword: indication; Author-Supplied Keyword: intentionality; Author-Supplied Keyword: materialism; Author-Supplied Keyword: original intentionality; Number of Pages: 8p

PY - 2011/1

Y1 - 2011/1

N2 - Alvin Plantinga (2006) presents an argument against materialism that is concerned with intentionality. His main contention is that according to materialism, intentionality is not a basic property of the brain or of any part thereof, and that intentionality cannot be determined by interactions among various physical items. I take issues with the latter claim, and argue that there is no reason to think that intentionality cannot be thus determined. I also suggest that Plantinga's failure is anything but accidental: the phenomenon of intentionality is neutral with respect to the mind-body problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AB - Alvin Plantinga (2006) presents an argument against materialism that is concerned with intentionality. His main contention is that according to materialism, intentionality is not a basic property of the brain or of any part thereof, and that intentionality cannot be determined by interactions among various physical items. I take issues with the latter claim, and argue that there is no reason to think that intentionality cannot be thus determined. I also suggest that Plantinga's failure is anything but accidental: the phenomenon of intentionality is neutral with respect to the mind-body problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

KW - Materialism

KW - Philosophy

KW - Positivism

KW - Realism

KW - Dualism

KW - content

KW - derived intentionality

KW - dualism

KW - indication

KW - intentionality

KW - materialism

KW - original intentionality

M3 - Article

SN - 1584-0778

VL - 10

SP - 113

EP - 120

JO - Analysis and Metaphysics

JF - Analysis and Metaphysics

ER -

Plantinga on Materialism and Intentionality

ملخص

ملاحظة ببليوغرافية

الوصول إلى المستند

بصمة

قم بذكر هذا