ملخص
Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson's argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.
اللغة الأصلية | الإنجليزيّة |
---|---|
الصفحات (من إلى) | 289-306 |
عدد الصفحات | 18 |
دورية | Philosophical Studies |
مستوى الصوت | 139 |
رقم الإصدار | 2 |
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء | |
حالة النشر | نُشِر - مايو 2008 |
منشور خارجيًا | نعم |