Levinas and Analytic Philosophy: Second-Person Normativity and the Moral Life

Michael Fagenblat (محرر), Melis Erdur (محرر)

نتاج البحث: كتاب / تقريركتابمراجعة النظراء

ملخص

This volume examines the relevance of Emmanuel Levinas's work to recent developments in analytic philosophy. Contemporary analytic philosophers working in metaethics, the philosophy of mind, and the metaphysic of personal identity have argued for views similar to those espoused by Levinas. Often disparately pursued, Levinas's account of "ethics as first philosophy" affords a way of connecting these respective enterprises and showing how moral normativity enters into the structure of rationality and personal identity. In metaethics, the volume shows how Levinas's moral phenomenology relates to recent work on the normativity of rationality and intentionality, and how it can illuminate a wide range of moral concepts including accountability, moral intuition, respect, conscience, attention, blame, indignity, shame, hatred, dependence, gratitude and guilt. The volume also tests Levinas's innovative claim that ethical relations provide a way of accounting for the irreducibility of personal identity to psychological identity. The essays here contribute to ongoing discussions about the metaphysical significance and sustainability of a naturalistic but nonreductive account of personhood. Finally, the volume connects Levinas's second-person standpoint with analogous developments in moral philosophy.

اللغة الأصليةالإنجليزيّة
مكان النشرMilton
ناشرRoutledge
عدد الصفحات302
رقم المعيار الدولي للكتب (الإلكتروني)9780429870071
رقم المعيار الدولي للكتب (المطبوع)9781138615946
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء
حالة النشرنُشِر - 27 نوفمبر 2019

سلسلة المنشورات

الاسمRoutledge research in phenomenology.
ناشرRoutledge

ملاحظة ببليوغرافية

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved.

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