Information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments: Evidence from subjective confidence

Asher Koriat, Ravit Nussinson, Herbert Bless, Nira Shaked

نتاج البحث: فصل من :كتاب / تقرير / مؤتمرفصلمراجعة النظراء

ملخص

Dual-process theories have been very influential in social psychology and cognitive psychology. These theories postulate a distinction between two modes of thought that underlie judgment and behavior (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Different labels have been proposed to describe the two modes (see Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004): nonanalytic versus analytic (Jacoby & Brooks, 1984), associative versus rule based (Sloman, 1996), impulsive versus reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), experiential versus rational (Epstein & Pacini, 1999), and heuristic versus systematic (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Although each of these labels emphasizes different aspects of the distinction, there is a general agreement that one mode of thought is fast, automatic, effortless, and implicit, whereas the other is slow, deliberate, effortful, and consciously monitored. Several researchers preferred to use the labels proposed by Stanovich and West (2000), System 1 versus System 2, which are more neutral.

اللغة الأصليةالإنجليزيّة
عنوان منشور المضيفHandbook of Metamemory and Memory
ناشرTaylor and Francis
الصفحات117-135
عدد الصفحات19
رقم المعيار الدولي للكتب (الإلكتروني)9781136648557
رقم المعيار الدولي للكتب (المطبوع)9780805862140
المعرِّفات الرقمية للأشياء
حالة النشرنُشِر - 1 يناير 2013
منشور خارجيًانعم

ملاحظة ببليوغرافية

Publisher Copyright:
© 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

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