Individualism and Narrow Content

نتاج البحث: نشر في مجلةمقالةمراجعة النظراء


The view that psychological explanations cannot but be individualistic (i.e., shared by duplicates) and the view of semantic externalism (i.e., that mental contents are not determined by individualistic features) seem to jeopardize the idea of intentional psychology. Introducing the notion of narrow content (as a function from environment to broad, referential, content) is supposed to defend the possibility of intentional psychology, and to reconcile it with both psychological individualism and semantic externalism. The introduction of narrow content is necessary to defend intentional psychology from the externalist threat. My argument to this effect will also shed light on the sense in which narrow content is semantic and indeed deserves to be called "narrow content". Though content ascriptions are, on their face value, ascriptions of broad content, they also have narrow readings that capture individualistic features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
اللغة الأصليةإنجليزيّة أمريكيّة
الصفحات (من إلى)139-153
عدد الصفحات15
دوريةLinguistic and Philosophical Investigations
مستوى الصوت8
حالة النشرنُشِر - يناير 2009

ملاحظة ببليوغرافية

Accession Number: 43292320; HOROWITZ, AMIR 1; Email Address:; Affiliations: 1: Open University of Israel; Issue Info: 2009, Vol. 8, p139; Thesaurus Term: Semantics; Thesaurus Term: Metaphysics; Subject Term: Individualism; Subject Term: Motivation (Psychology); Subject Term: Content (Psychology); Subject Term: Philosophy of mind; Subject Term: Philosophy -- Research; Number of Pages: 15p; Document Type: Article


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